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TURN OF THE SCREW: NARRATIVES OF HISTORY AND
ECONOMY IN THE GREEK CRISIS
DANIEL M. KNIGHT
London School of Economics and Political Science
The Greek crisis has become the most eminent example of neoliberal economic meltdown
over the past five years. In towns across Greece people try to come to terms with drastic
changes in their everyday lives and grapple with the complex mixture of politics, economy,
history and culture that informs crisis experience.
This paper addresses recurring themes in crisis narratives from the town of Trikala,
central Greece, within the context of local history and economy. Narratives condense
historical experience, fashion forms of cultural proximity and facilitate polytemporality.
As people recall the era of ciftliks (great estates), the Great Famine of 1941-43, and the
stock market collapse they construct a sphere of collective suffering and solidarity based
on adversity whilst simultaneously critiquing economic systems. Historical events
significantly inform present crisis experience in Trikala, adding local nuances to national
and global problems. Three prominent themes can be identified in daily narratives that
help locals comprehend the socioeconomic hardship: famine, suicide and colonisation.
These recurrent themes form the bases for collective suffering, encouraging solidarity in
the face of socioeconomic turmoil. In narrative, actors move seamlessly from past to
present, offering a critique of economic systems by means of historical embodiment.
Introduction: history, crisis, narrative
“Well, at least it is some sort of meal”, proclaimed Maria as we sat down for
Easter dinner. “It is not very impressive but they can’t take it all away from
us. We don’t have famine … yet”.
As Greece enters a fourth year of socioeconomic crisis, narratives of famine,
suicide, migration, xenophobia (Herzfeld 2011), and remarkable fortitude
allude to the indelible mark made upon a nation. Narratives are entwined
with the history of socioeconomic crisis as the period of the Ciftlikades
(great estate landlords), the Great Famine of the 1940s, war and colonisation
are brought into temporal proximity by current events (Knight 2012).
Since 2003 I have engaged in ethnographic research in Trikala, Thessaly,
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central Greece. The fieldwork spans a period of dynamic social change, as
years of economic prosperity have given way to crisis and austerity. The
town is a microcosm for the study of the Greek and wider European crisis
as the often abstract consequences of global economic trends are played
out within the context of a small, otherwise unremarkable town. People
themselves critique neoliberal ideals through everyday practice, turning to
history to comprehend changes in social relations and the dynamics of
abstract economic systems. However, in their forthright appraisal of the
consequences of crisis many actors are pressed into making strategic decisions
based firmly within neoliberal rationale in order to postpone destitution.
Local and global dimensions of capitalist relations are inscribed with historical
experience, suggesting that meaning in history appears as the hinge between
subjective experience and objective positions in neoliberal economic systems
(Narotzky 1997: 94). Social and economic anxiety is rationalised by the
proximity of past crises and primarily expressed through narrative, combining
past and present in polytemporal embrace and assisting the negotiation of
crisis experience (Sutton 2011, Knight 2012, Stewart 2012).
Narratives of crisis are both representative of wider political processes
and capture distinct local nuances. At the grassroots the picture is not as
monodimensional as portrayed through the mass media and in political
rhetoric.1 Images circulated internationally claim an objective critique of a
monolithic event, ‘the Greek crisis: a corruption of neoliberalism’ (itself a
paradox), disguising the intricacy of local circumstance and the multiple
layers of socioeconomic relations and historical context. Regional distinctions
of a wider crisis can be grounded in particular social, economic and historical
conditions and further identified in localised relationships between
industrialisation, modernisation and political change, what Narotzky terms
regionalised ‘dynamic and flexible economic structure(s)’ (2006: 337, also
Narotzky 1997: 111, Yanagisako 2002, Ballinger 2007: 59).2
Often narratives paint a contradictory picture of life during the crisis,
capturing multiple forms of everyday experience (Gilsenan 1996: 57). Some
are defiant, full of opportunism or even optimistic, others tell of destitution,
death and hopelessness. Entrepreneurism inhabits niches, there are radical
decisions, (ir)rational decisions, suicidal tendencies, anger at the government,
at the ‘system’, and much historical reflection. Michael Gilsenan (1996: 59)
emphasises that narratives are central to the negotiation of the realities of
power and authority and the realisation of a rapidly changing social scene,
constituting relations of contest and dominance. In narratives of turmoil the
value of social relations endures in an altered state, resembling Georg
Simmel’s argument that value is situationally relative and never a static
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inherent property, but rather a contextual judgement (Simmel 1978: 66–67,
Appadurai 1986: 3-4). Through narrative, models of capitalism, patronage
and nationalism are both relentless and exorcised. The primary way local
people negotiate this complexity is through an embodied critique of past
events, episodes themselves imbued with social, economic and political
rhetoric. This paper will highlight three main narrative strands of how
people come to understand the worst socioeconomic crisis of a lifetime and
how they contextualise their experience in historical accounts. Narratives
of famine, suicide, and colonisation form the bases for solidarity and collective
suffering in a time of severe turmoil and are one medium to connect culturally
proximate historical moments with a critique of present socioeconomic
conditions.
Narratives are an important expressive tool for people negotiating periods
of dramatic social change. Exchanged both in public and private spheres,
narratives collectivise crisis experience around central shared themes through
specific ‘story seeds’ (Carrithers 2007: 2) that condense historical experience
into polytemporally meaningful moments. The public sphere is the par-
excellence arena of socialisation in Trikala and provides highly visible and
metaphorical modes of understanding contemporary socioeconomic conditions.
It has become crucial as a space for narrative exchange during the current
crisis as national events are played out in the public domain. Portrayed as
adhering to rigid stereotypes of socialisation, political subjectivity and gender
in what Roger Just calls ‘a series of open forums and tightly closed doors’,
discussions of private and public spheres have been central to Mediterranean
ethnography since the 1960s (Just 2000: 157, cf. Friedl 1962, Campbell
1964, Dubisch 1995).
Through narrative exchange in the public domain, people comprehend
the moral underpinnings of political authority, status, and history, reflect
on past events and critically postulate future concerns (Ku 1999:49). Exchanges
are based on shared experience, thus intersecting cultural, historical and
political imagery and potentially instigating collective mobilisation, identity
construction, crisis negotiation, solidarity and collective suffering. Narratives
have the distinctive ability to condense the ‘then’ and ‘now’ as narrators
transcend temporal boundaries (Gilsenan 1996: 61).
In Trikala the topic of discussion is usually a cultural theme, social
issue or political event. The relevance of the events to the particular narrator’s
own experiences is paramount. The plot is a ‘temporal projection’ (Ku
1999: 53–57) and can lead to the symbolic embodiment of the theme by the
narrator. Temporal projections differ from ‘linear historicism’ (Stewart
2012: 190), allowing narratives of the Great Famine or ciftliks (great estates)
4 Daniel M. Knight
to intertwine with current economic pessimism. Narratives therefore incorporate
cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions of individual and collective
experience (Knight 2011, 2012).
Narratives rarely focus on the individual in a social and historical vacuum
as decisions in times of crisis are inextricably part of wider contexts as
protagonists are contributors to the market-economy and answerable to its
laws (Layton 2000: 110). People consciously participate in sociohistorical
systems not just respond to predetermined schemes; however, new strategies
of adaptation are often derived from previous experience. Robert Layton
notes that in eastern France the agricultural market economy is a product of
rural depopulation that began in the mid-nineteenth century. In turn, the
majority of economic change is related to shifts in state policy and the
differentiation in livelihood strategies being mutually influential in a form
of historical production (Layton 2000: 112, Narotzky 2004: 58). Social
relations and decision making are therefore neither exclusively the outcome
of an underlying structure nor are they purely the product of individual
agency. As history informs cultural repertoire, contemporary strategic decisions
are also products of historical embodiment as people draw on subjective
preference to inform economic actions (Gudeman 2009: 5). There are multiple
forms of persuasion influencing strategic economic decisions in times of
uncertainty and actions in crisis situations alter the trajectory of social
change. These decisions will feed future narratives and directly inform
future strategies. Through narrative, people draw on history and project the
future in complex polytemporality. Three collectivising topics prominent in
everyday narratives among Trikalinoi are famine, suicide and colonisation.
In narrating these themes actors move seamlessly from past to present,
offering a critique of economic systems by means of historical embodiment.
‘We are hungry with the same famine’
‘Famine is engrained on the Greek psyche’ I am told. ‘We do not want to
return to those dark days our grandfathers experienced’. The Great Famine
of 1941–1943 left an indelible mark on Greece and remains at the forefront
of narratives of crisis (Hart 1996:29, Knight 2012). An estimated 300,000
people died in Athens alone during the famine, primarily caused by the
systematic expropriation of food stuffs by occupying forces and Allied blockades
in the Eastern Mediterranean.3 Narratives of famine are predominant when
discussing the current crisis and food hoarding is now commonplace. Although
Trikalinoi did not suffer from the Great Famine on the scale of Athenians,
through processes of nationalism the event has become a marker of collective
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suffering, forming a narrative ‘history of traumatic past’ (Winichakul 2002:
245, Knight 2011, 2012). In contemporary Greece famine haunts the mind.
“I am scared. My grandfather told us stories of picking up stale pieces of
bread in the street of his neighbourhood and how he would take this home to
share with his family. We were taught about the famine in school, in books
and plays, we saw the pictures of rows of dead bodies. Now, even in Trikala,
the people are returning to times of famine. You see them in the rubbish bins
looking for food, or things they can sell for food. I have heard of people
catching cats or stray animals to satisfy their hunger, like they did in the
War. I have seen people attacking the moorhens on the river in the centre of
town. These things were once restricted to the poorest in Athens, but now it
is everywhere … We just worry that we will not have anything to eat tomorrow”
(Kostas, 25, Trikala).
A startling development of the crisis has been the search for food and
shelter in peripheral towns across Greece. In summer 2011 Trikala remained
largely shielded from this due to self-sufficiency and reciprocity practiced
among extended kin networks. Self-sufficiency is the systematic exploitation
of a household’s resources and the clear preference of households to utilise
such resources internally instead of buying readily available goods at market.
The concept of self-sufficiency relates to the idea of self-interest, referring
not to individuals but to whole households (Theodossopoulos 1997: 264).
Self-interest also dictates the protection of a household’s economic prosperity
and prestige.
By Easter 2012 narratives of the ruthless insufficiency of kin networks
in providing for the household were widespread. In one case, after recently
losing his job in Athens, a son visiting his elderly father in Trikala turned
off the freezer and emptied its contents into the back of his car before
returning to the city. He argued that he could no longer afford the electricity
to run the appliance and that his hungry children were his foremost concern.
In another account, a frenzied daughter slaughtered all her mother’s chickens
to hoard for a time of famine. These stories are now ineffaceable parts of
local mythologising, but there are rarely the ‘shadow presences’ of counter-
arguments challenging their legitimacy (Gilsenan 1996: 59). The following
accounts of being parsimonious are representative:
“My mother asks me, why do you not eat? I can not sit down for a meal
without her telling me I am ungrateful. I thought it was just my family, but
then I got talking to some friends. All their parents say the same, and with
the same justification. They always talk about food and the fact we are lucky
to have some … and the fact we may soon go hungry. This is why everyone
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is planting vegetables and fruit trees this year, rather than flowers … We
never throw any food away in our family as we know that our grandfathers
suffered famine. Nobody forgets these times and now they feel closer than
ever … we are beginning to see people dying from their hunger … or taking
there lives due to the fear” (Giannis, 39, Kalampaka).
“Now, at the supermarket I have to do things differently … Instead of buy-
ing a pack of three 2 litre bottles of coca-cola for my husband per week I
buy him one and tell him to make it last. I have to cut back on luxury items
and the amounts we serve at mealtimes … Instead of going to the bar three
times a week, we go only once and have one less beer. We are lucky here to
have family for childcare, to share food and help pay bills; some people no
longer have that. All the frightening things we get told everyday from the
media are bad, they are real problems, but they are scaring people into
taking drastic measures, sometimes to suicide, and what for? We are scared
of famine and financial destitution … but people got through those past
crises, they negotiated far worse, why can’t we? If we listen only to what
they say on television, we might as well give up now.” (Maro, 55, Trikala)
The current socioeconomic crisis is analysed by Trikalinoi in terms of
the Great Famine in order to confront the extraordinary. Food and famine
as historical symbols of deprivation have been notably discussed in a Greek
context by Michael Herzfeld and David Sutton. Cretan shepherds, Herzfeld
notes, employ the rhetoric of hunger in order to justify stealing livestock.
They cite hunger under Turkish and later German occupation as a justification
for stealing to avoid starvation. According to Herzfeld, a young Cretan
‘may still plausibly cite hunger as his motive for stealing several sheep in a
night’s work’ (1985: 21). In the same way as hunger punctuates narratives
of crisis in contemporary Trikala, it is the ideology of starvation that is
pertinent here as employed to critique both past and present circumstance
and to rationalise extraordinary actions. Two timeframes are brought into
proximity through the notion of hunger and irrational action rationalised
through polytemporal embodiment. Similar to Trikalinoi, Herzfeld’s Glendiots
rarely experienced truly devastating famine, yet hunger expresses further
notions of colonisation and deprivation. In this sense hunger is an ideological
disposition that is entwined with polytemporal narratives of hardship and
oppression. It is an idiom that has been nationalised and is now collectively
felt, feared and narrated.4
I have argued elsewhere (Knight 2012: 367) that in the current crisis
food has become a ‘context shifting marker’; a contextual indicator of
change whereby food no longer stands for commensality or festivities but
rather fear and deprivation. Narratives of famine also show that hardship
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can be conquered and overcome, thus giving perspective to current
circumstances. Sutton argues that food permeates memory resulting in a
form of polytemporality between significant events (2001: 2, 2011). The
historical reconstruction of the cultural significance of food can be deemed
part of the deep rooted ‘ethics of hunger’ (Sutton 2001: 23, also Seremetakis
1994:10) passed down generationally through narratives and nationalised
historical constructivism:
“My five year old child knows that I will never say ‘no’ to food. Even now
when we have no money, she can request dolls or other toys when we go to
the supermarket and I will refuse, but she knows that if she asks for food she
will get it. I allow it without thinking. It is something that I believe all
Greeks say to their children … I cannot bear to think of my child not being
able to have food or even me depriving her of it. It is something so strong
that runs throughout the culture of the Greeks and I don’t even realise I am
doing it until I stop and reflect and ask myself why … She at five years old
has heard the stories of the famine and I believe she now deliberately asks
for food” (Popi, 36, Trikala).
The importance of food as an ideology facilitating paradoxical crisis
negotiation transcends economic systems. On the one hand supermarket
shelves are emptied and products left unstocked, on the other extended
kinship networks are drained of supplies.5 As will become apparent, food
and famine are cited as central factors for opportunistic business activities,
colonisation, and even suicide.
“He just shot himself”
A taboo subject in central Greece, accounts of suicide are increasing. The
previous spate of suicide narratives in Trikala pertain to the stock market
crash of 1999–2000, a reference point akin to the Panic of 1907 or Great
Depression of the 1930s (Hart and Ortiz 2008: 3, Mishara 2008). Suicides
after the 1999–2000 crash hold particular resonance today and are infused
with rumour, gossip, and even the supernatural. By placing suicide accounts
in a historical context, people begin to come to terms with a highly stigmatised
social issue. The publicity of suicides is paradoxical as such cases would
usually be concealed to avoid social stigmatisation of the families involved,
as today suicides can still be associated with accusations of paranormal
activity, such as witchcraft and sorcery (cf. du Boulay 1974: 66, 142,
Stewart 1991: 222, Just 2000: 101–102, Buck and Pipyrou Forthcoming).
Until the early 1980s the financial system in Greece was characterised
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by institutional specialisation being required by law rather than informed
by market performance. The regulation of the financial system was conducted
through a complex matrix of credit rules in a predetermined administrative
environment. The first stage of liberalisation came under the PASOK
government of 1982 when the role of the Bank of Greece in controlling
monetary policy was enhanced and a limit was set to government funding
obtained from the National Bank (Hondroyiannis, Lolos and Papapetrou
2004). In 1990 the newly elected Nea Dimokratia government started to
follow a liberal Thatcher-Reagan style of economic policy, dismantling the
remaining state control of the market.
Reflecting the international trends of the mid and late 1990s, Greece
experienced a stock market boom from 1992–1999. Between January 1998
and September 1999 stock prices increased by an average 332.69% (Caporale,
Economou and Philippas 2008: 2). The boom was attributed to a combination
of the newly liberal and deregulated economic environment and falling
inflation and interest rates (Kyriazis and Diacogiannis 2008: 163). According
to Forbes, Skerratt and Yiannopoulos (2006), investor protection in Greece
was generally weak due to the conspiratorial culture of the trading on the
national market based in Athens, where companies looked after each other’s
vested interests before the interests of their own shareholders.
In the 1990s ‘playing the stock markets’ became a national phenomenon.
In Trikala almost everyone of legal age was involved in some way. There was
no need for the investors to be keen economists or follow the market trends;
the only thing that mattered was the public appetite to create money from nothing.
Due to the unregulated nature of the Athens Stock Exchange, local, national
and international organisations floated their companies— many of which were
‘rogue’—without internal controls on investor security and auditing.
For most of 1999 the Greek stock market continued to prosper. The
government continued to praise the market and refused to interfere to protect
small scale investors. In September 1999 the Athens Stock Exchange suddenly
went into free-fall. This particular crisis holds a prominent place in public
imagery due to the sudden widespread consequences. From December 1999
to March 2003 the Athens Exchange had lost 77.88% of its value (Caporale,
Economou and Philippas 2008: 3). Foreign investors sold their portfolios in
an attempt to escape the rapidly deteriorating situation, but the small investors
were worst affected. The majority of the general public held on to shares in
anticipation of the market picking-up so they could repay their loans taken
to finance original investments. It is estimated that during the 1999–2000
crisis over 100 billion euro were lost by small-scale investors.
Nikos is just one example of the many people in Trikala who lost their
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life savings, their homes and businesses and went into overwhelming debt
due to the crisis. He became suicidal. I was directed to his case in 2010
whilst discussing a recent ‘suspicious death’ in the town believed to be a
suicide as a consequence of bankruptcy. A major land owner, Nikos’ shares
had risen to 870,000,000 drachma by early 1999 (2,553,192 euros at the
2001 pre-single currency exchange rate). Nikos was waiting for his investments
to reach the 1 billion mark before cashing in. The crash hit before he
realised his objective and Nikos eventually lost two-thirds of his real estate
in Trikala.
“We were very greedy. We thought that we would never work again. We
said that once we reached X million drachma we would stop. Obviously we
just kept setting the goal higher. People did not believe that this would ever
end, it was free money, and we did not care. Once the markets started to
drop we still paid little attention as we thought that this was just a phase. We
did not take the money out, cash it in I mean, because we felt that we were
losing money despite the fact that we were still well in profit compared to
the initial investment … People like me lost whole fortunes, land, houses,
because they had sold property in order to invest in the market. I know some
people who became suicidal after the crash … indeed I became suicidal, but
some people lost their lives, especially if they felt they could no longer
support their family” (Nikos, 63, Trikala).
After this immense loss of capital, Nikos truly became suicidal and had to
turn to family and friends in order to rebuild his life. This collective
psychological support was vital as numerous family members were affected
by the crash. Other investors with unpayable loans, including multiple
mortgages, took their own lives and these accounts have become part of the
local repertoire of crisis, stories now eerily entwined with contemporary
tales of socioeconomic turmoil.
Suicide is again at the core of debates concerning financial ruin, highlighted
further by a series of recent high-profile cases. Regularly suicide notes
reveal the embodiment of culturally significant historical ideologies such
as famine and debt. In April 2012 a 77-year-old man took his life publically
in front of the Greek parliament building in Athens. On a handwritten note
he claimed he could not repay his loans and could not tolerate leaving his
children with debt. He stated that he did not want to spend his life searching
through rubbish bins for sustenance. The location of his death has since
become an informal shrine. In May 2012 there was another widely publicised
case of suicide when a mother and son jumped from a block of flats in
Athens. In a web entry the night before his death the son cited serious
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economic problems and the inability to purchase food as reasons for the
decision. In July 2012 a doctor jumped from the fifth floor of a hospital in
Lamia, central Greece, as family and friends looked on. Reports were unclear
as to exact provocations, but some claimed he had not been paid his pension
for six months and could no longer feed his family, others quoted long-
term psychological instability.6
The New York Times reported that suicide rates in Greece increased by
24 per cent from 2007 to 2009, with 1,800 reported cases in the past two
years compared to 700 in the two years pre-crisis. It is rumoured that these
numbers have been reduced and the reality is far bleaker. In 2011 cases of
suicide officially rose 40% on the previous year. These stories are public
examples of local realities that no longer inhabit the realms of the extraordinary
in Trikalinoi narrative (cf. Gilsenan 1996: 58).
“A man that lived in our village, he was a farmer, a simple person … waited
for his son to visit from Athens (who had just lost his job), sat down and had
dinner and drank tsipouro together. When his son left, the man went out to
the shed, picked up his shotgun, and just shot himself in the head. He could
not cope with his own debt repayments and seeing his son so poor … This
was the second case I heard of in a week … a relative of a fellow villager
also committed suicide as she couldn’t see any future in this financial ruin”
(Eleuteria, 60, Trikala).
The cause of suicides is unanimously attributed to the economic crisis,
the brutality of neoliberalism and the governmental response to structural
problems. Partially overheard conversations of rumoured suicide spread
quickly and ignite passionate debate in public spaces, such as supermarket
queues. The frustration demonstrated by discussants centres on the lack of
responsibility acknowledged by those in power, people who should be held
accountable for lives and deaths during the turmoil. Other cases of suicides
over the past fifty years punctuate everyday conversation more than ever
before. Suicide is emphasised rather than concealed in narrative, and political
and economic systems are widely held responsible. Precisely due to the
marginal nature of suicide in Greek society, accountability must be located
away from the Self. Facets of neoliberalism such as unsustainable loans,
ruthless accumulation, clandestine political bargaining, consumerist pressure
and the corruption of traditional socioeconomic morals are cited as primary
causes for the current increase in suicides, and provoke the explicit temporal
proximity of the 1999–2000 stock market crash.
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“Return of the Ciftlikades”
One narrative strand imbued with historical significance and teeming with
accounts of famine and hardship pertains to blame and accountability for
the crisis. Initially blame is directed towards the external Other, such as the
European Union, the so-called ‘Troika’,7 Germany and the United States of
America. Blame is placed on those perceived as making ‘decisions of global
consequence (that) shape the face of the world’ (Werbner 1995: 84, also
Herzfeld 1992). Locals criticise ‘the Other within’, those who sell-out the
‘Greek people’ to foreign demands. Elisabeth Kirtsoglou and Dimitrios
Theodossopoulos outline how Western interference breeds attitudes of anti-
globalisation in Greece creating an ‘indigenous reaction to centres of power’
(2010: 85). The same opposition to centres of power informs how ‘Athens’
is viewed by the Greek periphery—as a political system based on a lethal
combination of patronage, kin-based networks, and capitalist greed. Greek
politicians are seen as legitimising the colonisation process by selling-off
national assets to external bodies (Herzfeld 1992: 81, 2011). These accusations
are based on historical lines and are associated with notions of colonisation
and land ownership. Thessaly has been synonymous with vast tracts of
agricultural land for over five-hundred years and the workers subject to a
long list of occupations and appropriations. Sotiris, an elderly farmer from
Trikala explains,
“Our own Prime Minister (then George Papandreou) doesn’t care about us.
He does what the Americans and Germans say … it is a colonisation, a
return to the times of ciftliks; foreign owners of Greek soil, outsiders telling
us what to do … Do you know how many elderly women live alone in the
mountain villages, they have no central heating and no running water, but
the Prime Minister does not care if we starve as long as he gets money from
the Americans and Europe? Our families have suffered to secure their own
land first from Turkey, the Ciftlikades, and then Germany ... Our govern-
ment is to blame as much as the foreigners … All Greek politicians are the
same; as long as they fill their own pockets with money … they are the ones
that comply with the foreigners … We, the little people (laoutzikos), are the
ones with no money, the ones that suffer the consequences. Nothing has
changed in 100 years”8 (Sotiris, 70, Trikala).
Originally land grants made by Ottoman sultans to Muslim settlers in
Turkish-occupied lands, ciftliks were large landed estates operating in Thessaly
from the sixteenth century. At the end of the seventeenth century, ciftliks
became large private properties where the landlord held rights over whole
12 Daniel M. Knight
villages whose villagers became his tenants (colligi). During this period the
peasant workers were contracted under Ottoman laws which gave them
rights to a certain amount of their produce—usually either two-thirds or
one-half. After the annexation of Thessaly to Greece in 1881 the ciftliks
were purchased by Greek entrepreneurs of the diaspora and living conditions
for the colligi deteriorated (Mouzelis 1978: 77, Knight 2011). The peasant
farmers had been promised their own pieces of land after annexation despite
the rights of the Ciftlikades (ciftlik owners) being transferred intact through
the handover deal (Aroni-Tsichli 2005: 26).
The Greek entrepreneurs were enticed to invest in the old Ottoman
ciftliks as a means to recuperate losses made during the fluctuating economic
crises of the late 1800s, cumulating in the bankruptcy of the Ottoman
government in 1875–1876. Their absentee status meant that the new owners
employed stewards to manage the ciftliks. Any profit made by the Ciftlikades
was invested abroad, thus the wider Greek economy was by no means
benefiting directly from ‘foreign’ ownership.
Under the administration of the Greek Ciftlikades the colligi had no
legal protection against their landlord who was capable of exercising the
newly founded right of evicting his tenants whenever he pleased as ciftliks
were no longer the property of the state (Mouzelis 1978: 77, Inalcik 1985: 106,
Sant Cassia and Bada 1992: 24). The colligi were reduced to the role of
share-croppers and landlords continued to demand a rent of either one-half
or one-third of the gross product despite the contract of perpetual company
being no longer enforceable. Juliet du Boulay (1974: 8) notes that in the
village of Ambéli, Euboea, the villagers had to ‘beg their bread’ and thus
took to harvesting and threshing grain in secrecy. Parallels are constantly
drawn between this prominent historical era and current conditions in Thessaly.
“We are in the era of the new Ciftlikades. The collaboration between the
Greek state and foreign investors is the same. We are given so many prom-
ises but we are being slowly invaded whilst our livelihoods deteriorate. Just
like before, people are playing games and the workers of the land are left
thinking of the past. The workers will have to rise up” (Dimitris, 62, Trikala).
“I researched my history. We are all descendents of the people who worked
these plains. Now I can begin to understand what the colligi went through. It
is exactly the same. Our fields are being ruled by outside forces, we have no
protection and people are taking whatever they can … our own government
and Europe … to make as much money whilst they have the opportunity. I
have nowhere to sell my produce so must give my land over to them. They
are the biggest Ciftlikades ever and Greece has become the ciftlik of Europe”
(Michalis, 44, Kalampaka).
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Although commentaries on accountability are ‘fragmented, multiple,
contradictory and semantically vague’ (Kirtsoglou 2010: 168) fusing local,
national and global discourses, Trikalinoi continue to direct their frustration
both internally and externally, but always with historical reference. Politicians
and Ciftlikades are stereotypes of the ‘heartless system’ (Herzfeld 1992:
80) that appeal to the collective imagery. These caricatures are a common
thread in narratives of blame and resonate with accounts of famine, poverty
and suppression.
The theme of colonisation has recently widened to include Germany, as
local people and public figures continue to draw on historical notions of
occupation, often temporally condensing the period of the Ciftlikades with
German occupation. This is again closely linked to infliction of famine in
the 1940s. In 2010 Former Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos
publicly stated:
‘They [the Nazis] took away the Greek gold that was in the Bank of Greece,
they took away the Greek money and they never gave it back … I don’t say
they have to give back the money necessarily but they have at least to say
“thanks”’ (BBC News, 15th February 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8536862.stm,
accessed 15th May 2012).
The former Mayor of Athens, Nikitas Kaklamanis, also waded into the
dispute:
‘You [Germany] owe us 70 billion euros for the ruins you left behind [in the
war]’ (ibid.).
These narratives reflect growing public opinion that enforced austerity has
become a foreign-led attempt at colonisation in the mould of the Ciftlikades.
“The Germans have capitalised upon the plight of all Greeks. They have
bought our companies and held us to ransom. It is history repeating itself.
The Germans do not want to compromise and will take everything they can
from us. They caused us famine before; they will cause it again now. They
treat Greece as their private ciftlik. I am told that if I can’t sell my grain I
can install photovoltaic panels on my land, but most of these companies are
German-owned and using German products. It is another colonisation, they
are Ciftlikades and I don’t want to just hand over all I own” (Giannis, 47,
Trikala).
The concept of colonisation has been taken a step further by a recent
programme promoting photovoltaic installations on land possessed by
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struggling agriculturalists. There is an uneasy relationship when social systems
change and ‘men remain’ leaving actors with a multiplicity of criteria by
which to measure their achievements and aspirations (Simmel 1978: 353).
Such a multiplicity is present in contexts of land diversification. Since
2006–2007 a European Union supported initiative has encouraged Greek
agriculturalists without a market for their crops to install photovoltaic panels
on their land. The diversification programme has been met with mixed
feelings as the necessity for stable income is balanced against the notion of
returning to the era of ciftliks. Matters are complicated by the rich history
of land tenure in the region, acute historical consciousness, and political
issues of national food sufficiency stretching back over 200 years. German
investors have significant interest in large and medium scale photovoltaic
developments in Greece and have financed parts of the failing national
energy company. Installing photovoltaic panels on agricultural land is viewed
by locals as selling-off Greek assets to foreign free-market inspired programmes
and the increased German presence is viewed with great suspicion. Notions
of colonisation are exacerbated as installation companies advertise primarily
German products as this rhetoric sells reliability and reassures the consumer
of the quality of instalment.10 On a local level, people are asked to make a
rational choice between a purportedly stable monthly income and honouring
history. Yet, outside of Greece solar energy is heralded as the economic
saviour of a failing state. Renewable energy is viewed as a long-term
solution to fiscal austerity, international dependency and European energy
security and its adoption as a primary economic activity in central Greece
raises questions of sustainability and colonialism.
The financial productivity of land is currently very low. Unable to
secure markets for their produce, Trikalinoi agriculturalists face the daunting
prospect that crop production is no longer a viable livelihood strategy
beyond subsistence. Farmers are “growing photovoltaics” ( fitronoun
fotovoltaika) on their land as this is perceived as the only way to avoid
certain famine (cf. Gilsenan 1996: 121). The average monthly income from
selling the energy to the Greek power companies is greater than the revenue
from crop production. The average loan required for a 100 kw/h photovoltaic
development on agricultural land is 180,000 euro. These prices have decreased
significantly from five years previous, when an average 100 kw/h field
development cost 500,000 euro. Expenditure on photovoltaic installations
on private agricultural land can reach 750,000 euro. Loans are advertised
as returnable over 25 years ‘without repayments’—the repayments are
automatically deducted from the monthly income provided by the panels as
the energy is sold at a fixed 25-year rate to the national provider.11 Many
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companies advertise with guarantees that all loans will be cleared within
five years which raises the issue of risk in such a turbulent socioeconomic
environment (Knight and Bell 2012). As Petros, 56, explains:
“We are all doing it now (installing photovoltaic panels). It is the only
chance we have when our government bickers and struggles for power, the
people are suffering. I have no markets for my grain, my cereal; the land is
lying there useless. I have started “growing photovoltaics” for a stable in-
come and believe this is the only way we can escape the famine – by using
the land not for food, but energy.”
The paradox lies in the general acknowledgement that a major cause of the
current socio-economic crisis in Greece was the unregulated nature of
unnecessary bank loans from 1981 to 2007. Many landholders comment
they are prepared to take major loans even in a time of socioeconomic
instability as they perceive this scheme to be the only financially productive
programme currently running in central Greece. They live with the economic
crisis 24/7 and thus cannot afford to ‘put their lives on hold’ and must
continue ‘as if’ things are under control (Gilsenan 1996: 59). This is seen
as a calculated risk, despite the fact that many people do not believe that
the 25- or 50-year contracts to pay an agreed rate will be honoured.
Many Trikalinoi believe the economic risk involved with substantial
loans and the uncertain future of Greek participation in the eurozone and
European Union is outweighed as this is the only viable economic opportunity
currently accessible in the region (Knight and Bell 2012). They acknowledge
that a return to the drachma is a worrying prospect as not only would loans
remain intact at euro-time levels, but repayments would likely be translated
into drachma, as would the agreed purchase rate per kw/h. The contracts
signed during the euro-era would potentially be deemed irrelevant.
Furthermore, Greek companies would not be restricted by the austerity
policies imposed by the European Commission, International Monetary
Fund and European Central Bank and a potential European Union exit
would deem the programme politically extinct, calling into question the
validity of existing contracts and potentially leaving vast areas of agricultural
land obsolete. The rhetoric of market persuasion, coupled with overt historical
consciousness on themes such as famine, legitimise the decision to diversify
(cf. Gudeman 2009).12
The sustainability of this approach to diversification has to be interrogated
in light of the long-term nature of the contracts. Once signed, contracts tie
the land to between 25 and 50 years for the sole purpose of photovoltaic
energy production. Due to the rapidly increasing popularity of the current
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solar programme, much agricultural land—Thessaly has long been known
as ‘the bread basket of Greece’—has been taken out of circulation. This
raises questions for local and national self-sufficiency in grain and cereal
vital to sustainable socioeconomic recovery. By encouraging energy security
through the large-scale solar programme, locals concede that food security
may be threatened, echoing similar problems throughout the agricultural
history of modern Greece pre-dating the annexation of Thessaly from the
Ottoman Empire in 1881. Nevertheless, people are persuaded to take rational
decisions according to a European Union-advocated neoliberal market ideology
despite overtones of colonisation based on historical reflection. The necessity
imposed by crisis is a sufficient explanation for an exchange that would
otherwise be non-equivalent (Gilsenan 1996: 121). As circumstance has
transformed so has value, yet they recognise that the long-term rationale of
‘growing photovoltaics’ is unsustainable and their land may be turned into
the ‘ciftliks of Europe’. As an struggling agriculturalist from Trikala states,
“The priority is to feed my children and pay my bills. For this, I can afford
to look no further than tomorrow. I am scared of the famine my father
experienced and thus I must do whatever I can … now I must give my land
to the Ciftlikades (in order) to survive” (Alexandros, 62).
As conditions have drastically shifted and ‘men remain’, the routes to
negotiate crisis may not be historically appealing and are often based within
the same economic rationale that brought about the turmoil—specifically elaborate
loans and free-market prospecting. As Trikalinoi say, ‘life must go on’ as
‘people make their way toward some kind of livelihood while the currents they
float on hurl them here and there’ (Narotzky and Smith 2006: 122).
‘Don’t talk about fight club’ or the ‘Theatre of the absurd’
Three strongly linked narrative strands of crisis have been presented. All
represent a microcosm for the analysis of national and global phenomena
but also highlight the local nuances of neoliberal crisis experience, or what
locals term ‘Fight Club’. History plays a significant role in crisis negotiation
as people draw on critical events of cultural import to form a localised
understanding of a global episode. Temporal moments are conflated to
create a polytemporal interpretation of contemporary circumstances (Stewart
2012: 193). Suicide and the adoption of the photovoltaic programme are
further critiques of economic futures based on historical reflection. The
‘Greek crisis’ is a trope that highlights the complex relationship between
global systems and local experience. On a narrative level, accountability is
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located in periods of history, political actors, and economic systems. The
role of food and famine is prominent throughout, in accounts of death,
colonisation, land appropriation, and as justifications for following short-
term market rationales.
In all cases actors generate discourses of collective suffering that emphasise
heroism and triumph alongside victimisation (Verdery 1996: 77, Ballinger
2003: 12). People repersonalise the crisis from being an abstract search for
accountability amidst the dynamics of global politico-economics to something
allowing for common purpose based on shared history and shared future,
creating a spirit of solidarity through communal participation. Collective suffering
provides actors with common narratives of pain and endurance, what Jill
Dubisch terms ‘a community of pain . . . to protest against injustice’ (Dubisch
1995: 214, Pipyrou 2012). Actors are able to find a common thread through
which to provide mutual support and advice. In this case, suffering is an
embodiment of history that transcends individual narrative to publicly express
culturally specific experiences. Past socio-economic crises pertaining to famine,
death and financial collapse serve as points of collective reference, a reminder
that the current situation can be endured, can be overcome.
The current crisis will become part of historical experience, to be embodied
as culturally integral sometime in the future (Goddard 2006: 268, 279). The
themes of famine, suicide and colonisation are prominent in the cultural
repertoire of Trikalinoi and will possibly be employed once again to critique
political and economic situations. However, critiques of economic systems
do not necessarily imply radical changes in practice. Despite overt historical
consciousness, Trikalinoi feel obliged to follow short-term solutions based
on the same neoliberal ideals that contributed to socioeconomic turmoil. In
their overarching evaluation of the current crisis, locals trace the upheaval
to the programme of unregulated liberalisation initiated by the governments
of the early 1980s when Greece joined the European Union. A special
place in local condemnation is reserved for the availability of excessive
bank loans for unnecessary purposes during this period; ‘loans lead to
unhappiness, they are a burden, and they change your personality. . . . When
you cannot pay a loan they can repossess your house, destroy your life and
your children will go hungry. . . It will drive you insane’. Nevertheless,
such practices are often championed as solutions to hardship through specific
programmes, such as photovoltaics.
Neoliberalism is concerned with the overall productivity of the polity in
an internationally competitive world by outsourcing a major part of governance
to the market.13 Such dissemination of power requires regulation to prevent
competition from illegitimate sources because ‘neoliberals are as afraid of
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anarchy as anyone else’ (Narotzky and Smith 2006: 23). The economic
practices of the grassroots level are the enterprises of neoliberalism where
people are empowered to believe they are making a decision outside of
regulated market conditions, a belief reinforced by the promise of benefits
in the resulting social system (Narotzky and Smith 2006: 23–25). Local
and regional models of neoliberalism provide actors with modes of
legitimisation based on shared historical and cultural convictions. Stephen
Gudeman (1986) has notably argued that cultural models are scripts for
economic processes, and Susana Narotzky further suggests that material
relations are interlocked with local cultural contexts within a framework of
wide-ranging capitalist forces and global hegemonic cultures. Local economic
structures must be studied in their cultural and historical development since
actors themselves are inscribed with historic processes of labour relations
(Narotzky 1997: 190, 211).
The stock market collapse of 1999–2000 demonstrated that it is impossible
to get money from nothing in an ambivalently regulated market, and in
extreme cases attempts to do so led to suicide. The photovoltaic programme
offers a ‘stable’ income in exchange for ‘colonised’ land and a substantial
loan. The history of ciftliks has taught Trikalinoi that ‘foreign’ ownership
of agricultural land provides no local benefits if the income is invested
outside the region. Nevertheless, the enticement is considerable as people
feel severely restricted by limited economic opportunities and the burden
of a tangible history of famine. A cynic may suggest that the government is
propagating unsustainable sustainability, but locals understand this as a
licensed solution to avoiding their greatest fear—famine. Accounts of suicide
and famine are not mere history; they are embodied daily and are in the
public domain through constant media coverage. Through critical reflection
on famine and suicide, value has been renegotiated and exchange re-
rationalised. Famine, suicide and colonisation mediate an understanding of
the roots of contemporary circumstance, help people come to terms with
dramatic social change, and inform future strategic investment. Hunger is
always cited as the foremost concern due to intense historical connotations,
a prioritisation reflected in economic activity.
Diversification projects, such as photovoltaics, can destabilise efficient
strategies for regulating market relations on the local level, exacerbated in
times of extreme socioeconomic crisis. Local investment in neoliberal
programmes in a collapsing market will significantly influence future economic
trajectories in the region.14 The tangled relationship between culturally and
historically informed repertoires of economy and transnational market logic
is emphasised in initial reluctance to adopt ‘rational’ neoliberal schemes.
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Selection and rejection of (ir)rational economic routes is considered in
direct relation to sociohistorical experience, with people highlighting the
relationship between past events, present demands, and future trajectories.
In this ‘Theatre of the Absurd’, complex forms of critical persuasion pull
on the actor’s decision-making processes—notions of colonisation compete
with the fear of famine, under the influence of market rhetoric and consumerist
pressure. Actors manage to provide an emphatic critique of economic futures
through the embodiment of historical moments.
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Notes
1. The ‘Greek Economic Crisis’ has become a persuasive ‘trope’ for political
change across Europe (cf. Fernandez 1986, 1993). International media cover-
age of the Greek crisis has created political opportunity on national stages as
the event is appropriated by political bodies. Among European publics the
‘Greek crisis’ is synonymous with poor government, austerity measures, fi-
nancial bail outs, civil unrest and economic turmoil. It has become a piece of
political propaganda that successfully provokes fear, panic and movement
for political change elsewhere. The Greek case is a metaphor of persuasion
developed beyond the national borders of Greece to incite responses similar
to those of the people experiencing the ‘Greek crisis’ firsthand. Such head-
lines as ‘Britain is facing its own Greek tragedy’ (BBC, 28 April 2010) and
‘We face going the same way as Greece (if there is no political change)’ are
paramount to election campaigns across the continent.
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2. Here Narotzky’s definition of ‘regional’ is followed: ‘the placeboundedness’
of economic activities that incorporate specific local understandings of social
capital and the wider economy (2006: 339).
3. Gilsenan encountered similar narratives of enforced famine in relation to
conditions of Turkish occupation during the First World War. In this case,
land was often exchanged for 36 kilos of grain (1996: 121–123).
4. In the context of the 2001–2002 economic crisis in Argentina, Goddard com-
mented on the power of depictions of starvation and malnutrition to incite
collective mobilisation. She contrasts these images with the national rhetoric
of preservation and prosperity (2006: 277).
5. One example of multiplicity of economic systems can be found in the local
management of multinational supermarket chains where despite official company
policy employees obtain their jobs on a patron-client basis. If a person does
not have a network of contacts that relate him/her with the local branch
manager then there is little hope of obtaining a job, regardless of curriculum
vitae, highlighting the complex relationship between state policy, unions,
employers and employees in Greece (Featherstone 2008: 7). In practice, Trikalinoi
often frequent these large chain stores only ‘as a last resort’ as they exist on
the boundaries of local conceptual worlds. People would rather patronise
smaller shops belonging to friends and family (Just 2000: 174–177). The
visits to the multinational supermarkets are perceived as faceless market
relations between isolated partners (ibid.:182). In cases of employment and
consumer choice the instrumental weight of personal and affective relations
are demonstrated (cf. Narotzky 2006: 340, Narotzky and Smith 2006, Knight
2011: 174, 282). Narotzky presents a similar example of the use of ‘middle
men’ in restricting interaction between local producers and national markets
(1997: 195).
6. Another high profile suicide was in the news at the time of this paper going
to press. Former Deputy Interior Minister Leonidas Tzanis, 57, hung himself
at his home in the town of Volos, Thessaly, on 4th October 2012. He was
under investigation by the Financial Crimes Unit.
7. ‘Troika’ is the name given in Greece to the partnership between the European
Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank.
8. During the Argentine economic crisis of 1998–2002, the country had five
presidents within two weeks (Page 2009: 1, Goddard 2010: 131–132). The
persistent demands for a completely new government to be installed in Greece
(even since the 2012 elections) echoes the Argentine case in 2001 when the
slogan ‘They must all go – not a single one should stay’ was adopted by
protesters (Goddard 2006: 271).
9. For a discussion of colonialism in the context of the current economic crisis
see Herzfeld 2011.
10. In reality however often low-cost Chinese panels are installed without the
knowledge of the consumer in order to provide further maintenance work in
forthcoming years.
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11. Energy generated by photovoltaic panels on agricultural land does not sustain
any energy consumption in the investor’s property.
12. William Milberg (2009) argues that economics is no longer a complete system
of assurance but instead persuasion now negates uncertainty.
13. An interesting alternative theoretical angle on competing economic rationales
can be found in post-socialist literature, especially given Chris Hann’s (2007)
call for ‘history-sensitive anthropology’. Birgit Müller’s (2007) account of
transition to capitalism in East Germany outlines how competing economic
systems at the time of the German Wende (turnaround) provided a plethora of
possibilities for social relations based on historical consciousness. The road
to democratisation and liberalisation also raised questions about the rationality
of the market economy, power relations, and social control (2007: 2–3).
Katherine Verdery (1993) argues that in times of crisis suffering can always
be explained in relation to grand narratives of nation and economy, whilst
Ina Dietzsch (2010) emphasises the persuasive rhetoric of modernity.
However, Greece is not a post-socialist nation. Furthermore, in applying
this approach we must address the paradox that the most significant period of
liberalisation in Greece was instigated by the socialist governments of the 1980s.
14. As Layton notes in France, ‘households which have a similar composition
and economic status at one moment may increasingly diverge in response to
demographic variables or the accessibility of alternative employment’ (2000:
107, 255, 358).
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